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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the potential impact of the Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and 
Aluminum on employment using county-level data. This study finds that although 
employment has increased in steel and aluminum related manufacturing industries, it has 
decreased in a significant downstream industry of manufacturers of steel products. 
Furthermore, I analyzed the difference in employment trends between counties that voted 
majority Trump in the 2016 presidential election and counties that voted majority 
Clinton, and between counties that experienced marginal victories and counties that voted 
solidly Democrat or Republican. I find that Trump counties have experienced the impact 
of the tariffs more strongly than Clinton counties, whether positive or negative. Similarly, 
swing counties have seen a much larger positive trend in employment in the primary 
metal refinement and processing industries, and a much larger negative trend in steel 
product manufacturing from purchased steel compared to non-swing counties.    
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I. Introduction 
	
“Putting America First!” 
	
On September 17, 2018, Donald Trump tweeted “Tariffs have put the U.S. in a 
very strong bargaining position, with Billions of Dollars, and Jobs, flowing into our 
Country – and yet cost increases have thus far been almost unnoticeable. If countries will 
not make fair deals with us, they will be “Tariffed!” (@realDonaldTrump). Trump’s goal 
of returning manufacturing to American employees can best be summarized by his two 
2016 presidential election campaign slogans— “Make America Great Again” and 
“America First.” He ran on a platform of representing the disenfranchised, bringing 
strength back to traditionally “American” industries, and standing up to other 
economically powerful nations who threatened the U.S. hegemony in international trade. 
Two years into his term, on March 1, 2018, President Trump announced his intention to 
impose tariffs on steel and aluminum. He invoked Section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 which authorizes the president to adjust specific imports from other countries 
if the importation “is in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to 
impair the national security.”  
In this study, I analyze the impact of the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs 
on primary metal manufacturing sub-industry employment in the United States. This will 
then allow me to explore whether there have been statistically significant differences in 
employment trends in counties whose popular vote was won by President Trump in 2016 
versus those whose was won by Hillary Clinton. Finally, because of Trump’s emphasis 
on protecting the fringe voters of America, I analyze the differences between counties 
	 7 
that had marginal victories and counties that had either a strong Democrat or strong GOP 
victory.  
The Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum were made effective less than 
one month after President Trump’s announcement, setting into motion a 25% import duty 
on steel and a 10% import duty on aluminum. This quick turnaround simplifies analysis 
because the potential impacts of both the announcement and the actual implementation of 
the tariffs occur almost simultaneously. The EU, Canada, Mexico, Australia, Argentina, 
Brazil and South Korea were initially exempt from the tariffs, but as of June 1, 2018, the 
steel import duty applies to all countries of origin except Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and 
South Korea; the aluminum import duty applies to all countries of origin except 
Argentina and Australia. Although President Trump made his protectionist trade beliefs 
clear throughout his campaign and the first half of his presidential term, the magnitude of 
these tariffs came as a shock for many people around the world, but especially American 
importers of the two primary metals.  
This was the second of six waves of tariffs that were passed in 2018, the first 
being the safeguard tariffs on washing machines and solar cells. This era of American 
trade has been categorized as a “trade war” because of the tit-for-tat retaliation that has 
taken place between the U.S. and its trading partners, most notably, China. Many 
retaliatory tariffs have been passed by trading partners of the U.S., including China, the 
EU, and NAFTA members, often with the intention of targeting Trump counties. For 
example, agriculture and automobile manufacturing, typically strongly Republican 
industries, have been largely impacted by these retaliatory tariffs (Parilla and Bouchet, 
2018). 
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Why Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum? 
	
Much of the rhetoric coming from the Trump administration regarding these 
tariffs focuses on national security. The White House hopes that enacting tariffs on some 
of the United States’ most significant trading partners will demonstrate to the world that 
it will not tolerate unfair treatment that weaken the U.S. economically, such as export 
dumping. Trump also notes the potential of the tariffs to speed up the slow manufacturing 
employment growth that had occurred during the Obama era. Manufacturing is one of 
several industries that have not yet recovered from the 2008 financial crisis, during which 
it lost more than 15% of its employment (Hertz et al. 2014). Both Steel Mills and 
Aluminum Production employment are great examples of this stagnated growth, still well 
below their pre-recession levels, as seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2.  In 2017, employment 
in Steel Mills was actually lower than it was at the end of the recession in 2009, despite 
having shown some signs of recovery in the early 2010s. Many people believe that this 
slow recovery is partly the result of the rise of extremely cheap goods imported from 
countries such as China, whose innovations in mass production have driven costs down 
immensely.  
During his campaign tour in June 2016, Donald Trump gave a speech in a factory 
in Pennsylvania. He declared: “We are going to put American steel and aluminum back 
into the backbone of our country. This alone will create massive numbers of jobs, high-
paying jobs, good jobs, not the jobs we have today, which everybody agrees are bad jobs. 
We’re going to create massive numbers of good jobs.” This gave hope to many 
individuals who had felt disenfranchised during the Obama era and were still feeling the 
sting of the recession. A significant aspect of Trump’s ability to get re-elected in 2020 
	 9 
will depend on whether or not he followed through with this promise of revitalizing 
American manufacturing.  
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Figure 1: American Aluminum Production Employment (2013-2018) 
Figure 2: American Steel Mills Employment (2013-2018) 
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Despite President Trump’s steadfast optimism, it was initially predicted that the 
tariffs might adversely affect employment in the United States because industries that 
require large amounts of steel and aluminum as inputs would face higher costs to 
production. Many people also compared this round of tariffs to the steel tariff passed by 
President George W. Bush in 2002, which was found to have caused significant 
employment loss in the U.S (Francois and Baughman, 2013). Tariffs have the potential to 
cause significant price increases because domestic producers no longer face competition 
from foreign producers. Figure 3 demonstrates the mechanism through which tariffs raise 
domestic prices.  
 
 
 
Early analysis of the tariffs also noted that the steel and aluminum manufacturing 
industries in the United States, as a whole, employ far fewer Americans than other 
manufacturing sectors, leading many to question why Trump would choose to focus on 
these industries. One possible explanation has to do with the fact that these industries are 
Figure 3: Impact of Tariffs on Domestic Prices 
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historically “American,” namely that they were critical sectors in the early industrial 
development of the nation. Furthermore, many of President Trump’s supporters have 
backed his neo-mercantilist policies which stem from his slogan: “Put America First,” 
partly because manufacturing has historically been concentrated in Republican counties.  
In the case of steel and aluminum, China is one of the United States’ largest 
competitors. In late 2018, the Pentagon concluded that China was deliberately dumping 
certain goods that are crucial for the manufacturing of American national defense 
equipment in order to undermine U.S. national security. (Seligman, 2018). For American 
firms that used steel and aluminum as inputs, these cheaper foreign goods were actually 
beneficial. However, with the tariffs now causing these previously cheap imports to 
become much more expensive in the United States and no longer giving the consumer a 
cheaper option, domestic producers can raise their own prices, which this study 
demonstrates has already begun to occur. These tariffs have also led to the passage of 
several rounds of retaliatory tariffs by China, targeting several significant industries in 
the U.S. such as agriculture.   
Due to the highly politicized nature of these tariffs, the media immediately began 
following their impact. “One week after the Commerce Department recommended heavy 
tariffs on steel and aluminum in February, Mr. Czachor [CEO of the American Keg 
Company] gathered 10 of his 30 workers in a conference room at work and broke the 
news that they were being laid off” (WSJ, 2018). This is just one example of several 
companies to appear in the media following Trump’s announcement of the tariffs that 
publicized potential layoffs due to the higher input costs. On the other hand, a study done 
by the Economic Policy Institute found that three aluminum smelters are re-opening and 
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22 new projects have been announced using significant amounts of aluminum (Scott, 
2018). Anecdotally, the tariffs have made a significant impact on manufacturing firms, 
both positively and negatively, across the nation.  
This example of the significant shift in American foreign policy reflects a larger 
trend in the global macro-political arena. The rise of several controversial, polarized 
leaders who are unafraid to challenge the status quo has led to an era of great uncertainty 
in international trade and investment. With the U.S. much less willing to act as the global 
hegemon under its “America First” prerogative, renegotiating its long standing trade 
partnerships, and standing up to what it sees as “bullies,” the future of international trade 
remains unclear. Analysis of the welfare impact of these impending changes will critical 
in the coming years.  
In Section II, I discuss the relevant literature regarding the quantification of the 
impact of tariffs throughout American history, and how this paper contributes to past 
studies. Section III summarizes the data sources and its key characteristics. In Section IV, 
I outline the methodology of the study. The results of the regression analysis are 
presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper with a 
discussion of the implications of the results on both American and international politics.  
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II. Literature 
	
The tariffs enacted by the Trump Administration were implemented in 2018 so 
there is limited literature on their specific impact thus far. However, the history of tariffs 
in the United States begins close to the nation’s own conception with the passage of the 
Tariff of 1789. Similar to the Trump administration’s tariffs, the Tariff of 1789 
immediately faced immense backlash. In 1893, William Hill wrote an article titled 
“Protective Purpose of the Tariff Act of 1789.” He writes: “The manufacture of steel in 
America is in its infancy; but as all the materials necessary to make it are the produce of 
almost every state in the Union, and as the manufacture is already established and 
attended with considerable success, I deem it prudent to emancipate our country from the 
manacles in which she has been held by foreign manufacturers” (Hill, 1893). This 
argument is strikingly similar to ones used today by those in favor of the recent 
protectionist policies. From the Tariff Act of 1789 to the Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and 
Aluminum, the United States has gone through several different eras of import duties. 
However, rhetoric regarding the necessity of the tariffs have typically centered on both 
national security and needing to protect American industry from foreign competitors who 
have captured too great of a share of the international market.  
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 is another example of a protectionist policy 
implemented by the United States government.  Title VIII of the Act “provide[s] the 
President with authority to enforce bilateral export restraint arrangements, including the 
authority to deny entry of steel products” as well as “contains a ‘sense of the Congress’ 
provision calling for an import level for basic carbon steel products of between 17 and 
	 14 
20.2 percent.” In a subsequent study, Tarr and Morkre (1984), for the Bureau of 
Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, explore the aggregate costs of 
tariffs and import quotas, especially due to the Trade and Tariff Act. Using general 
equilibrium models, the estimated cost of the quota to the U.S. consumers was $1.1 
billion and the cost to the U.S. Economy as a whole was $780,000 (Tarr and Morkre, 
1984). 
In 2002, invoking Section 201 of the 1974 Trade Act, President George W. Bush 
enacted a variety of tariffs on steel imports from all countries except for Canada, Israel, 
Jordan, and Mexico, ranging from 8 to 30%. These tariffs lasted exactly three years and 
one day. It was estimated that more American workers lost their jobs due to the tariffs 
than the number of people employed in steel manufacturing altogether (Francois and 
Baughman, 2013). In total, their study finds that nearly 200,000 Americans lost their jobs 
due to these tariffs. They explain that the reason so many manufacturing sub-industries 
were significantly impacted was because nearly 98% of the companies in the United 
States at the time employed less than 500 people. Small companies tend to be “price 
takers,” meaning that they are subject to the will of the market. If input prices rise, they 
must either pass the higher prices onto the consumer, who may refuse to pay, or they 
must absorb the cost of the inputs themselves, while keeping prices fixed. Together, these 
effects may lead to decreased profit and decreased employment. Many scholars have 
questioned whether the United States is doomed to repeat its history.  
In a preliminary study of the US Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, Ciuriak 
and Xiao (2018) attempted to quantify the impact of the policy shock. Ciuriak and Xiao 
(2018) used a recursive-dynamic variant of the standard Global Trade Analysis Project 
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(GTAP) CGE model to assess the impacts of the policy shocks. The outcome estimates 
the potential job loss that they predicted would occur as firms had to adjust to the 
increased steel and aluminum prices. An estimated 22,700 job losses were predicted to 
occur, with the majority coming from unskilled labor (Ciuriak and Xiao, 2010). They also 
find that labor productivity in the U.S. would fall by about 0.05 percent. 
Two recent NBER studies published in March 2019 analyze the welfare impact of 
the trade war to date. Amiti et al. (2019) concluded that there was “complete pass-
through of the tariffs into domestic prices” and that “the full incidence of the tariff falls 
on domestic consumers, with a reduction in U.S. real income of $1.4 billion per month by 
the end of 2018.” Another significant finding is that foreign exporters of steel and 
aluminum have not adjusted their prices lower to offset the additional cost of the tariffs to 
their consumers. As a result, steel and aluminum prices in the United States have 
remained high since mid-2018. Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) found that “the export supply of 
foreign varieties is horizontal, suggesting that U.S. consumers bear the incidence of the 
U.S. tariffs.” They also find that the retaliatory tariffs passed by the United States’ 
trading partners disproportionately targeted Republican-dominated industries, such as 
manufacturing and agriculture. This is a political strategy meant to hurt Trump in the 
places where it hurts him the most. Finally, Fajgelbaum et al. (2019) estimate that about 
$68.8 billion have been lost by the U.S. since the beginning of the trade war. 
In this study, I will attempt to expand on past literature in quantifying the welfare 
impact of protectionist tariff policy in the United States by analyzing employment 
changes in steel and aluminum manufacturing sub-industries on a county level, rather 
than statewide or national level. Although there have been a small number of previous 
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studies attempting to quantify the impact of the tariffs, nearly all analysis has been done 
at the state level. However, some states may see great levels of variation in the 
employment trends between counties (especially larger states such as California and 
Texas) that, when analyzed at the state level, may overlook some critical changes that 
occur at a more disaggregated level. Large counties typically hold larger firms, who are 
both more likely to employ the majority of workers in a particular industry, and less 
likely to be impacted by the tariffs. Analysis at the county-level ensures that changes in 
smaller firms are not absorbed by the changes in the few larger firms. Furthermore, 
looking at the county level may be more useful for exploring the relationship between 
political majority, especially in swing counties, and level of impact from the tariffs.  
The goal of this study is to assess whether the most recent tariffs passed by the 
Trump Administration achieved its goal of initiating the restoration of American 
employment in steel and aluminum manufacturing to its pre-recession levels. I will also 
look at the inherent ties between economic outcome and political affiliation. The highly 
contentious and polarized nature of the 2016 presidential election has lasted long into the 
Trump presidency, and is heavily manifested in reactions toward his protectionist trade 
policy. Many of Trump’s supporters have staunchly backed the recent tariffs, but 
manufacturing employment is heavily comprised of Republican supporters. The results of 
this study will provide insight into whether President Trump’s tariffs have had a negative 
or positive impact on primary metal manufacturing employment thus far.  
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III. Data 
	
This study aims to explore whether the Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum 
have significantly impacted employment in certain manufacturing sub-industries, and 
whether the impact differs between Trump majority and Clinton majority counties. I 
compiled steel and aluminum PPI data from FRED. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, I compiled monthly employment data for 
each sub-industry in all 3,242 counties and county-equivalents in the United States from 
2013-2018. I use the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to explore 
three different 4-digit sub-industries that are most likely to have been directly impacted 
by the tariffs. 
The three main industries involved in the manufacturing of steel and aluminum 
products are Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing (NAICS 3311), Steel 
Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel (NAICS 3312), and Alumina and 
Aluminum Production and Processing (NAICS 3313). Steel Product Manufacturing from 
Purchased Steel involves the production of steel products such as sheets, wire, and tubes 
from purchased raw materials, while the other two sub-industries are involved in the 
initial refinement and processing of raw steel and aluminum. Therefore, it is the firms 
within NAICS 3311 that might be selling their products to the firms within NAICS 3312.  
For each sub-industry, I required that a county have reported consecutive, non-
zero monthly employment data over the span of the entire observation period. Table 1 
lists the number of counties for each sub-industry that fulfill this requirement. Note that 
these three industries comprise a small subsection of counties and manufacturing 
	 18 
employment in the United States, which makes it interesting that President Trump chose 
to target them with his policy.  
 
Table 1: Number of counties that employ in each sub-industry 
Sub-Industry Number of Counties 
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Mfg 459  
Steel Product Mfg from Purchased Steel 674  
Aluminum Processing and Production  122  
 
 
 
The majority of counties in my data report fairly small employment numbers in 
each sub-industry. According to the Small Business Administration, 99.9% of businesses 
in the United States in 2014 were small business and nearly 50% of the private workforce 
was employed by small businesses. The SBA has placed the threshold at a maximum of 
500-1500 employees for a manufacturing firm to be deemed a “small business.” Smaller 
businesses are more susceptible to market fluctuations such as input price shocks. This 
means that these counties with low employment may be more strongly affected from the 
tariffs compared to the few counties that house larger firms, who do not necessarily need 
to absorb the higher input prices themselves. 
 The data from the 2016 presidential election comes from Tony McGovern (2017). 
He compiled this data from The Guardian and Townhall.com, two news service that 
posted the results of the election in real time. Data is available for each county and 
county-equivalent on the percentage of people that voted for each party, county 
characteristics such as average income, household size, demographic makeup, etc., as 
	 19 
well as whether the majority vote switched parties from 2012. Table 2 presents the 
percentage of counties within each sub-industry that voted for Trump in 2016. Counties 
with significant manufacturing employment as a proportion of their overall employment 
have a long history of voting Republican. Many of these counties are concentrated in the 
South and the Midwest in deeply red states. However, some of Trump’s policies have not 
been targeting strongly Republican areas, but rather counties in the swing states. These 
votes are going to be the most crucial when Trump goes up for reelection in 2020, so it is 
in his best political interest to focus on garnering their support. I characterize swing 
counties as those with a margin of victory of less than or equal to 10%. In my data, 41% 
of the counties that employ these industries had marginal victories. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of counties that voted for Trump in the 2016 election 
Sub-Industry % of counties that voted for Trump 
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Mfg 44.5% 
Steel Product Mfg from Purchased Steel 36.5% 
Aluminum Processing and Production 40.3% 
 
	
	 The majority of employment in my data is concentrated in urban areas. The top 
three employers for Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing are Wayne 
County, Michigan; Porter County, Indiana; and Jefferson County, Alabama (a century 
ago known as the “Pittsburgh of the South” given its rich history of steel production). Of 
these three counties, Wayne County and Jefferson County hold the state capitals and 
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voted Democrat. Only Porter County, a non-urban county, voted Republican. Steel 
Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel displays a similar pattern within its top 
three employers—Cook County, Illinois; Mississippi County, Arkansas; and Harris 
County, Texas. Mississippi County is the only mainly rural county and it voted 
Republican in 2016. Aluminum Processing and Production also had one non-urban 
county within its top three employers, and it similarly voted for Trump. This is important 
to note because the majority of individuals employed in these industries that Trump 
aimed to protect work in Democrat counties.  
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IV. Methods 
	
This study implements a fixed effects model for employment such that  
(1)  𝑌"# = 𝛽& + 𝛽(𝑥"# + ⋯+ 𝛽+𝑥+# + 𝛿-𝑇- + ⋯+ 𝛿#𝑇# + 𝛼" + 𝑒"#. 
It is comprised by an unbalanced panel of 3,242 counties and county-equivalents. 
The outcome of interest is the natural log of employment and the covariates of the model 
include monthly national manufacturing employment levels and a dummy variable for the 
tariffs where  
(2)  𝑥"# = 0	𝑖𝑓	𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑖𝑠	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ	2018	𝑜𝑟	𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒1	𝑖𝑓	𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒	𝑖𝑠	𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ	2018 . 
A fixed effects model can be used to determine the overall trend in employment 
over the last five years. In order to focus my results on relative changes, I will be taking 
the natural log of employment. Furthermore, I will use a dummy variable for the tariff, 
with each observation assuming a value of 1 if the month is post-March 2018. The same 
model can be utilized on a disaggregated county level to obtain individual coefficients for 
each county and county equivalent. Using controls such as overall manufacturing 
employment and GDP to reflect general economic conditions allows this study to isolate 
the potential effect of the tariffs. This is especially important because manufacturing, as a 
whole, has grown very strongly since President Trump began his term in 2017. The fixed 
effects model will account for average differences across counties in any observable or 
unobservable predictors. 
An OLS regression can be run on the aggregated employment for counties that 
voted for Trump and counties that voted for Clinton. A Wald test for the null hypothesis 
	 22 
that the two coefficients on these regressions are equal is utilized to determine whether 
the two groups of counties have trended in a statistically significantly different way. This 
method will then be used to compare swing counties and non-swing counties. These two 
regressions will provide insight into whether Trump’s supporters have benefited from the 
tariffs, thereby justifying their support of the tariffs, and whether the swing counties that 
President Trump focused on in his 2016 presidential campaign have seen increased 
employment. It is likely that Trump will continue to focus on the marginalized voters in 
the U.S. in the run-up to the 2020 election.   
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V. Results 
 
Steel and Aluminum Prices 
	
An OLS regression between steel PPI and the tariff dummy variable was 
performed to check that the tariff may have impacted the prices of steel and aluminum in 
the United States. Increased prices and an inelastic consumer market made up of metal 
product manufacturers might lead to increased profit for steel and aluminum 
manufacturers, and potentially increased employment. Downstream industries of steel 
and aluminum manufacturing may instead face the opposite as their inputs become 
costlier, and could be forced to lay off workers in response.   
 
Table 3: Simple OLS Regression of Steel and 
Aluminum PPI on the Tariff Dummy 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Steel Aluminum 
   
Tariff Dummy 0.152*** 0.140*** 
 (0.00133) (0.0263) 
Constant 5.345*** 4.819*** 
 (0.000432) (0.00814) 
Observations 73 73 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficient of a tariff dummy in a regression on log steel and aluminum 
monthly PPI. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, both steel and aluminum prices statistically significantly 
increased after March 2018. Average PPI for Cold and Hot Rolled Steel Sheets increased 
by 15.2% after the tariffs were implemented, while PPI for Aluminum Sheet and Strip 
increased by 14%. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show this sharp increase in price for the two 
most commonly used forms of steel input in manufacturing. We might expect steel prices 
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to have increased more than aluminum prices because a 25% import duty was placed on 
steel, compared to a smaller 10% duty on aluminum.  
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Figures 4: Producer Price Index by Commodity for Metals and Metal 
Products: Hot Rolled Steel Sheet and Strip 
Figures 3: Producer Price Index by Commodity for Metals and Metal 
Products: Cold Rolled Steel Sheet and Strip 
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Employment 
	
 
Table 4: Panel fixed effects regression 
  Iron and Steel Mills Steel Product Mfg 
from Purchased Steel 
Aluminum Processing 
and Production 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Tariff Dummy 0.0656* 0.216* -0.109** -0.629** 0.132* 1.384 
  (0.0387) 
  
(0.123) (0.0436) (0.243) (0.0678) (8.438) 
Log Mfg 
Employment 
  -1.797   6.220   15.10 
    (81.28)   (58.12)   (84.32) 
Constant 4.845*** 26.11 5.267*** -68.33 5.037*** -173.4 
  (0.0461) (961.7) (0.0316) (687.6) (0.0516) (996.3) 
Observations 2,538 2,538 3,414 3,414 1,716 1,716 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficient of a tariff dummy in a regression on log employment data for 
NAICS 3311, 3312, and 3313.  The tariff dummy assumes a 1 if the observation occurs after March 2018. 
Model 2 includes log manufacturing employment in the U.S. to control for overall trends in the industry. 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 4 outlines the results of the initial fixed effects regression of log 
employment on the tariff dummy variable. At the 4-digit NAICS code level, there is a 
strong positive relationship between employment in both Steel Mills, and Aluminum 
Production and Processing. In Model 2, the former has seen an increase in employment of 
approximately 21.6%, significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on aluminum 
production was large and coefficient, however, it was not significant. These coefficients 
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demonstrate that the tariffs have been effective in sheltering American employment and 
potentially creating stronger growth in primary metal manufacturing in the United States. 
With the ability to increase prices to firms that are mostly small, and therefore price-
taking, steel and aluminum manufacturers may have increased profits, higher production, 
and the ensuing growth to be able to employ a larger number of workers.  
Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel, on the other hand, has seen a 
nearly 63% decrease in employment since the implementation of the tariffs, as seen in 
Column (4). This was significant at the 5% level. Higher input prices for these firms may 
mean that they have themselves have absorbed the costs or that they have passed the cost 
on to the consumer, presumably leading to decreased demand. Regardless of this choice, 
the firms in this sub-industry are likely have lost profit and therefore have been forced to 
lay off employees. The results of these three sub-industries align closely with the 
anticipated effects of the tariff. The 15% increase in steel input prices I found likely 
contributed to the job loss in this industry. It is likely that other sub-industries that 
significantly use steel and aluminum as inputs have faced similar decreases in 
employment. 
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Table 5: Panel fixed effects regression of Trump vs. Clinton counties 
  Iron and Steel Mills Steel Product Mfg from 
Purchased Steel 
Aluminum Processing and 
Production 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Trump Clinton Trump Clinton Trump Clinton 
Tariff Dummy 0.114*** 0.029*** -0.129** -0.064 0.197*** 0.026 
  (0.0302) 
  
(0.002) (0.0299) (4.843) (0.019) (0.029) 
Log Mfg 
Employment 
-1.953***  -2.62*** -3.837***  -0.782*** 2.682*** 3.153*** 
  (0.492)  (0.357)  (0.34) (0.154)  (0.216) (0.296) 
Constant 28.518 5.259*** 50.853 14.769*** -26.713***  -31.974*** 
  (16.838) (0.007) (4.043) (1.822)  (2.557) (3.507) 
Observations 2,538 2,538 3,414 3,414 1,716 1,716 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficient of a tariff dummy in a regression on log employment data for 
NAICS 3311, 3312, and 3313 in counties that had a majority vote for Trump in the 2016 presidential 
election and counties that had a majority vote for Clinton. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01,       
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Further analysis of the differences between the counties that voted for Trump 
versus the counties that voted for Clinton demonstrates a significant difference between 
the two groups. Table 5 displays the results of the Trump versus Clinton majority county 
analysis. Columns 1, 3 and 5 provide the results of a fixed effects regression of log 
employment on the tariff dummy variable of only Trump elected counties. Columns 2, 4, 
and 6 present the results for the Clinton majority counties. For both the steel and 
aluminum processing industries, Trump counties have had greater employment increases 
than Clinton counties. Steel mills employment in Trump counties has increased by about 
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11%, versus 3% in Clinton counties. Similarly, aluminum production employment has 
increased by nearly 20% in Trump counties. The coefficient for Clinton counties is 
smaller, but not significant. Interestingly, for Steel Product Manufacturing from 
Purchased Steel, the Trump counties have had a 13% decrease in employment, and 
Clinton counties, though not significant, have had a 6% decrease. Therefore, the Trump 
counties have experienced the change in employment in each sub-industry more strongly 
than the Clinton counties, whether positive or negative. The results for the Wald test for 
the post-estimation hypothesis that the coefficients of the Trump and Clinton counties are 
equal confirm that two groups of counties have trended in a statistically significantly 
different manner.  
 
 
 
Table 6: Panel fixed effects regression of swing 
vs. non-swing counties 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Swing Non-Swing 
   
Tariff Dummy 0.192*** 0.027*** 
 (0.041) (0.009) 
Log Mfg 
Employment 
-4.347*** -1.122* 
 (0.383) (0.637) 
Constant 57.14*** 18.721** 
 (4.544) (7.568) 
 
Note: This table presents the coefficient of a tariff dummy in a regression on log employment data for 
NAICS 3311, 3312, and 3313 in counties that had a marginal victory of ten percent or less (Column (1)) 
and counties that solidly voted Democrat or Republican (Column (2)). Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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	 An aggregated panel fixed effects regression of the swing versus non-swing 
counties reveals an overall larger increase in employment in counties that were 
marginally won in 2016. Swing counties have seen nearly a 20% increase, while non-
swing counties have seen about a 3% increase, both significant at the 1% level. This is a 
significantly large difference between the two groups, possibly pointing to the high 
degree of interaction between political environment and economic outcome. A Wald test 
confirms that the swing vs. non-swing counties have trended in a statistically 
significantly different manner.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 This study found that the Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs have been 
successful in their first year at protecting American primary metal manufacturing, which 
the Trump administration has described as an industry that is critical to national security. 
Both Steel Mills and Aluminum Processing and Production have seen statistically 
significant increases in employment since the tariffs were made effective at the end of 
March 2018. In this regard, Trump’s hope for assisting in the recovery of these industries 
has been successful.  
However, this study also shows that the intermediary industry in metal product 
manufacturing, Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel, has seen statistically 
significant decreases in employment since March 2018. This was the greatest concern of 
many prominent economists, who noted the fact that U.S. firms that use steel and 
aluminum to make their products might be forced to charge more to their customers 
(Tangel and Simon, 2018). In industries with elastic demand, this could cause significant 
decreases in profit. Steel Product Manufacturing, on the other hand, has a very inelastic 
demand for the processed steel materials that they use as inputs, meaning that the firms 
must accept the higher prices being offered by steel and aluminum processors. Of the 
three industries in this study, Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel had, on 
average, the largest number of Americans employed in each year of the study.  
 I also found that counties that voted for President Trump in 2016 have seen larger 
increases, compared to Clinton counties, in both Steel Mills and Aluminum Processing 
and Production employment. On the other hand, Trump counties have also seen a larger 
decrease in employment in Steel Product Manufacturing from Purchased Steel compared 
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to the Democrat counties. This could be explained by several reasons. For example, the 
Trump counties hold the majority of smaller firms in the United States for these three 
sub-industries. Larger firms tend to be located in urban areas, which overwhelmingly 
vote Democrat. Small manufacturing firms typically have much smaller profit margins 
compared to their larger counterparts and, as a result, they are often at greater risk for 
macroeconomic shocks, including commodity price shocks. During the 2007-09 
recession, small businesses were found to be more cyclically sensitive than large firms, 
thereby leading to a relatively larger decline in employment than for large businesses 
(Fort et al. 2012).  
Finally, the results of the different trends between swing and non-swing counties 
shed light on the success of President Trump’s focus on the marginal voters of the 2016 
election. Swing counties, characterized in this study as counties in which the margin 
between Trump votes and Clinton votes was less than or equal to 10%, have had a 
statistically significantly larger increase in employment compared to solidly Trump or 
solidly Clinton counties. Presidential candidates often focus on the marginal votes 
because with the immense polarization in the United States, it is nearly impossible to 
switch solidly Democrat or Republican voters.  
 This paper provides several insights into the role of tariffs in today’s national and 
international political landscape. Although they may be economically viable in terms of 
protecting the industries that produce the goods on which import duties rest, tariffs 
remain politically unpopular. One of the main tenets of neoliberal economic theory is that 
free trade is beneficial to all parties involved. Trump has challenged the status quo of the 
international system by re-negotiating trade partnerships such as the TPP and NAFTA 
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and by signaling to the rest of the world that the United States will no longer tolerate 
unfair trade practices such as dumping. Although Trump states that he is forming these 
policies with the U.S. economy in mind, the escalating trade war between the U.S. and its 
trading partners could weaken the global economy, as a whole. This, in turn, could 
incidentally impact the American economy. 
 Heading into the upcoming 2020 election, analysis of the economic outcome of 
the voters from 2016 will be critical. Trump will undoubtedly continue to tout the success 
of the Section 232 tariffs in sheltering primary metal manufacturing employment. 
However, many studies of similar past tariffs found significant decreases in employment 
in several downstream steel and aluminum industries that have had to face higher input 
prices. As this study analyzes employment just one year out from the implementation of 
this round of tariffs, future longer-term analysis will be extremely useful.  
It is crucial now, more than ever, for individuals to take international politics into 
account when making political decisions. Foreign policy, especially trade, has long 
remained out of the interest and knowledge of most of the public, but citizens are now 
beginning to find their voice on foreign policy issues. Trump may believe that “trade 
wars are good, and easy to win” (@realDonaldTrump), however the convoluted nature of 
the administration’s protectionist policies and the subsequent retaliatory measures taken 
by trade partners, or adversaries, of the United States significantly affects the welfare of 
American citizens.  
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